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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Case No. 14482 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : 
LUCKIE JOHN HOWELL, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal matter with defendant/appellant having 
been charged with aggravated assault upon the person of one 
Gene Bunderson in violation of Section 76-5-103 of the Utah 
Criminal Code.
 f 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant/appellant was found guilty of the crime of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Criminal Code, Section 76-5-103 in the District Court of Box 
Elder County, State of Utah. Defendant/appellant was sentenced 
to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years. 
The case comes before this Honorable Court on a certificate 
of probable cause entered by District Court Judge"VeNoy 
Christofferson, that a justiciable issue is presented for 
determination by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Defendant/appellant is free on bond pending appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower Court's finding 
of guilt in light of the defense of insanity and absence of 
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a culpable state of mind as a result of intoxication. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 17, 1975, appellant was charged by Complaint 
filed in the City Court of Brigham City, County of Box Elder, 
State of Utah, with the crime of aggravated assault. On 
April 23, 1975, a preliminary hearing resulted in appellant1s 
being bound over for trial in District Court. On April 29, 
1975, defendant/appellant filed Notice of Defense of Insanity 
and Irresistible Impulse. On the 30th day of September, 1975, 
trial was held in the District Court of Box Elder County; Judge 
VeNoy Christofferson presiding without jury. The defense 
presented evidence and testimony of appellant's long term 
abuse of drugs and alcohol and the result and effect on his 
behavior. Expert evidence was admitted in the form of psychiatric 
reports.. The matter was continued for further hearing on 
October 28, 1975, at which time a finding of guilty was entered 
against appellant. Sentencing was continued pending receipt 
of additional psychiatric reports. On October 28, 1975, the 
matter was again continued pending psychiatric reports and a 
report from the Adult Probation and Parole Department. On 
January 26, 1976, appellant was sentenced to the Utah State 
Penitentiary for a term not to exceed five years with the 
recommendation that the prison staff determine the proper 
invironment for intensive inpatient psychiatric treatment. 
Execution of sentence was stayed pending defense filing of 
motions to support motion for certificate of probable cause. 
On February 9, 1976, the matter came on for further hearing 
-?-
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at which time defense motions to release defendant on bond 
pending appeal and for stay of execution of sentence were 
granted. The issue comes to the Supreme Court on certificate 
of probable cause. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT IS A CRIME WHICH REQUIRES THAT 
THE PROSECUTION PROVE, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
THE EXISTENCE OF A SPECIFIC INTENT AND CONSCIOUS 
OBJECTIVE TO CAUSE BODILY INJURY. INTOXICATION 
OF THE DEFENDANT CAN NEGATE SUCH INTENT. 
Section 76-5-102, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
defines the crime of assault as follows: 
M(l) Assault is: (a) An attempt, with unlawful 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or (b) A threat, accompanied by a 
show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another. (2) Assault is a 
class B misdemeanor." 
The elements of the offense are set forth in Section 
76-5-103 as follows: 
11
 (1) A person commits aggravated assault if 
he commits assault as defined in section 
76-5-102 and; 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury. 
(2; Aggravated assault is a felony of the 
third degree." 
The argument that the burden of proving, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, intent as a necessary element of the crime 
of assault rests with the prosecution is further supported by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Section 76-2-102, U.C.A. as follows: 
"Every offense not involving strict liability 
shall require a culpable mental state, and 
when the definition of the offense does not 
specify a culpable mental state, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to • • • 
establish criminal responsibility. An 
offense shall involve strict liability 
only when a statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to 
impose strict liability for the conduct by use 
- of the phrase 'strict liability1 or other 
terms of similar import.11 
The case of State v. Seely, Kansas, 510 P2d 115 (1973) 
involved an appeal from a conviction of aggravated battery. 
Reversing the conviction and remanding the case for a new 
trial, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that failure of the 
lower Court to instruct the jury on simple battery constituted 
reversible error where the defense was based on intoxication 
to such a degree that defendant was incapable of forming the 
intent requisite to a conviction of aggravated battery. 
Absent intent, i.e., a culpable mental state, there is 
no crime. This principle of law was set forth by J. Cooley 
in People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156 (1878) as cited and quoted 
extensively in the case of People v. Crittle, 212 N.W. 2d 
196, Wich. (1973). 
"The test, to use Justice Cooley1s words again, 
is: 
'While it is true that drunkenness cannot excuse 
a crime, it is equally true that when a certain 
intent is a necessary element in a crime the 
crime cannot have been committed when the intent 
did not exist...if the defendant, for any reason 
whatever, indulged no such intent, the crime 
cannot have been committed...f 
The Cooley test does not require the defendant 
to be 'not conscious of what he was doing or 
why he was doing it,' it only requires in a 
specific intent crime that the defendant not 
/. 
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have the specific intent.11 
Commonwealth v. Graves, Pa., 334 A2d 661 (1975) involved 
an appeal from a conviction of first degree murder, robbery 
and burglary. Reversing and remanding for new trial, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court said as follows: 
"The only permissible probative value evidence 
of intoxication may have in criminal proceedings 
is where it is relevant to the question of the 
• capacity of the actor to have possessed the 
requisite intent of the crime charged. Where 
the legislature, in its definition of a crime, 
has designated a particular state of mind as 
a material element of the crime, evidence of 
intoxication becomes relevant if the degree 
of inebriation has reached that point where 
the mind was incapable of attaining the state 
of mind required. It must be emphasized that 
although evidence of intoxication never 
1
 provides a basis for exoneration or excuse, 
it may in some instances be relevant to establish 
that the crime charged in fact did not occur.11 
Further, citing 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law I 68, the 
Pennsylvania Court set forth the rule of law: 
"Where a particular purpose, motive, or intent is 
a necessary element to constitute the particular 
kind or degree of crime, it is proper to consider 
the mental condition of accused, although produced 
by voluntary intoxication, and where he lacked the 
mental capacity to entertain the requisite purpose, 
motive, or intent, such incapacity may constitute 
a valid defense to the particular crime charged, 
and the same rule applies to voluntary intoxication 
resulting in mental incapacity to indulge premeditation 
or deliberation, which precludes conviction of an 
offense wherein premeditation is essential, 
The majority rule, holding intoxication to an extent 
precluding capacity to entertain a specific intent 
or to premeditate to be a defense, does so not 
because drunkenness excuses crime, but because, 
it the mental status required by law to constitute 
crime be one of specific intent or of deliberation 
and premeditation, and drunkenness excludes the 
existence of such mental state, then the particular 
crime charged has not in fact been committed. 
Where a specific intent is an ingredient of the 
crime charged, the fact that accused1s drunkenness 
-S-
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is voluntary does not render the defense of 
intoxication incompetent, since the intent 
to become intoxicated does not tend to prove 
an intent to commit the offense.M (Footnotes 
ommitted). 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law 1 68, pp. 
217-219. 
The burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
defendant had the requisite culpability rests with the state 
once defendant presents evidence that his intoxication 
negated the element of intent. This principle of law is 
set forth in the case of People v. Aguirre, 111., 334 NE 2d 
123, (1975). Aguirre was decided by the Appellate Court of 
Illinois on appeal from a conviction of aggravated battery, 
aggravated assault, and disorderly conduct. The Court said: 
1
 "The aggravated battery indictments charged 
defendant.with intentionally committing 
batteries upon officers Lawson and Phifer. 
For the State to prove that the defendant 
acted intentionally, it must introduce 
evidence which demonstrates beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant's conscious purpose 
or objective was to commit a battery upon the 
officers. (111. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, i 4-4.) 
Ordinarily, the requisite mental state can be 
inferred from the character of the act. But 
once a defendant has introduced evidence to 
show that a drugged condition negated the 
existence of the requisite mental state and 
such evidence raises a reasonable doubt, the 
State must then overcome the affirmative 
defense by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the existence of the requisite mental state.11 
(Citations ommitted). 
POINT II. 
THE UTAH CODE PROVIDES THAT A MENTAL DISEASE 
OR DEFECT CONSTITUTES A DEFENSE TO A CRIMINAL 
CHARGE. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended provides as 
follows: I 76-2-305. ' . " 
-6-
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"(1) In any prosecution for an offense, it 
shall be a defense that the defendant, at the 
time of the proscribed conduct, as a result of 
mental disease or defect, lacked substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law. 
(2) As used in this section, the terms 'mental 
disease1 or 'defect1 do not include an abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise 
antisocial conduct.ff 
Mental disease or defect can be caused or aggravated 
by prolonged use of alcohol and/or drugs which result in 
bizarre behavior which may or may not be permanent in its 
manifestations. Such mental defect constitutes a defense 
to a criminal charge of aggravated assault. 
The case of People v. Kelly, Cal., 516 P2d 875 (1973) 
was decided by the California Supreme Court on appeal from 
a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. The defendant 
in Kelly had an extensive history of drug abuse. 
The decision of the lower Court in Kelly and in the case 
at bar turned on the "consciousness11 of defendant during the 
commission of the assault and the fact that she voluntarily 
ingested the drugs. The evidence in Kelly as in the case at 
bar, indicated that defendant was normally sane, but that her 
..."voluntary and repeated ingestion of drugs over a two 
month period had triggered a legitimate psychosis", p. 877, 
and that, as here, the abuse was the cause of a temporary 
psychoses. Defendant Kelly raised the defense of insanity. 
The California Court supported its reversal as follows: 
"It is fundamental to our system of jurisprudence 
that a person cannot be convicted for acts performed 
while insane. (People v. Nash (1959) 52 Ca. 2d 36, 
50-51, 338 P. 2d 416; Pen. Code, I 26, subd. Three.) 
Insanity, under the California M'Naughton test, 
-7-
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denotes a mental condition which renders a 
person incapable of knowing or understanding 
the nature and quality of his act, or incapable 
of distinguishing right from wrong in relation 
to that act." (Citations ommitted). 
In Kelly, the trial Court found that at the time of the 
crime, the defendant was not capable of knowing right from 
wrong. In the case at bar, a report by a Court appointed 
alienist stated specifically and unqualifiedly that in his 
opinion defendant herein "did not have the capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform to 
the requirements of the law" due to his impairment as a result 
of drug and alcohol abuse. 
Under the similar circumstances of Kelly, the California 
Court said: 
"As we have already stated, voluntary intoxication 
by itself is no defense to a crime of general 
intent such as assault with a deadly weapon. 
(See fn. 14 and accompanying text.) However, we 
have repeatedly held that 'when insanity is the 
result of long continued intoxication, it affects 
responsibility in the same way as insanity which 
has been produced by any other cause." 
"When long-continued intoxication results in 
insanity, however, the mental disorder remains 
even after the effects of the drug or alcohol 
have worn off. The actor is 'legally insane', 
and the traditional justifications for criminal 
punishment are inapplicable because of his 
inability to conform, intoxicated or not, to 
accepted social behavior." 
POINT III. 
THE UTAH CODE SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT 
INTOXICATION CONSTITUTES A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL 
CHARGES WHEN IT NEGATES THE MENTAL STATE 
REQUISITE FOR CONVICTION. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended provides: 
.p. 
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1 76-2-306. "Voluntary intoxication shall 
not be a defense to a criminal charge unless 
such intoxication negates the existence of 
the mental state which is an element of the 
offense; however, if recklessness or criminal 
negligence establishes an element of an offense 
and the actor is unaware of the risk because of 
voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is 
immaterial in a prosecution for that offense." 
,- Even absent insanity, voluntary intoxication can afford 
a defense to criminal charges when a requisite element of a 
crime, i.e., intent, is negated by that intoxication. In 
State v. Seely, supra, the Kansas Court, citing requested 
jury instructions, said as follows: 
"As previously noted, the instruction on mental 
condition actually given in lieu of appellant's 
requested instruction was PIK Criminal 54.12: 
'Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a 
criminal charge, but when a particular intent 
or other state of mind is a necessary element 
of the offense charged, intoxication may be 
taken into consideration in determining whether 
• the accused was capable of forming the necessary 
intent or state of mind.' 
This instruction was in accord with K.S.A. 1972 
Supp. 21-3208(2), which provides: 
'An act committed while in a state of voluntary 
intoxication is not less criminal by reason 
thereof, but when a particular intent or other 
state of mind is a necessary element to constitute 
a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may 
be taken into consideration in determining such 
intent or state of mind.' 
Thus, voluntary intoxication such as afflicted 
- appellant would be a defense if it rendered him 
incapable of forming a 'particular intent' which 
formed a necessary element of the crime charged." 
The state of intoxication need not render one unconscious 
in order to diminish capacity sufficiently to negate intent. 
The California Supreme Court so held in the case of People 
v. Ray, 533 P 2d 1017 (1975). Ray was heard on appeal from a 
conviction of voluntary manslaughter. The defense set forth 
-9-
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was that defendant, though conscious, was so intoxicated 
that he could not form the intent necessary to support a 
conviction of voluntary, as opposed to involuntary manslaughter. 
Reversing the lower Court, the California Supreme Court said: 
"The weight of the evidence of defendantfs 
intoxication was sufficient for a jury to have 
believed that although he was conscious he 
lacked both malice and an intent to kill. 
(See id., at p. 720, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P. 
2d 913.) The court was required, accordingly, 
to have instructed that if, because of a 
diminished capacity due to defendant's voluntary 
intoxication, he had harbored neither malice nor 
an intent to kill the offense could be no 
greater than involuntary manslaughter.ff 
CONCLUSIONS 
Aggravated assault is a crime which requires that the 
prosecution prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence 
of a specific intent and conscious objective to cause bodily 
injury to another. Information of the actor can negate such 
intent. Without the requisite intent or culpable state of 
mind, there is no crime. 
Insanity which results from intoxication affects 
responsibility the same as does insanity caused by other . 
factors. In such cases, criminal punishment is inapplicable. 
Intoxication is, by statute, a defense to a criminal 
charge when such intoxication negates the intent or state 
of mind necessarily requisite as an element of the particular 
offense. 
Attorneys for defendant/appellant 
-10-
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